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There is some general truth to the narrative that cultural studies moved away from its fraught, yet productive, 
entanglement with Marxist critique in the 1980s, never again to seriously rekindle that engagement. The trajectory 
of the work of Raymond Williams, however, moves in the opposite direction to much of that field of inquiry of 
which Williams is often identified as a founder. I will argue, for instance, that on the question of method, the work 
of Raymond Williams is increasingly influenced by debates in Marxist cultural theory. More so, the question of 
method itself, and in particular the problematic of mediation, both become central concerns for Williams—
fundamental theoretical occupations which he shared with the Western Marxists, such as Theodor Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin. The increasing centrality of the problematic of mediation, in its various 
guises—the dynamics of materialist critique, the relation between structure and agency, the question of 
determination, and even the movement of the dialectic—in Williams‟ later work, reflects a deepening engagement 
with traditional Marxist categories while never claiming a simple identity with Marxist critique.  
 
The deepening engagement with traditional Marxist categories signals both a continuity and a rupture within the 
trajectory of Williams‟ analytical method over his career: for instance, the approach which Williams first calls 
“cultural materialism” evolves into an approach which in his later work he comes to refer to as the “sociology of 
culture.” My goal in this chapter is to sketch the movement of the critical method which Williams calls the 
sociology of culture and why the question of mediation is a central dimension of it. However, rather than describe 
Williams‟ analytical approach in abstraction, I will attempt to demonstrate some of the dynamics of a sociology 
of culture approach through the articulation of the contemporary cultural phenomenon of Reality TV. While 
Williams did not live long enough to witness the explosion of Reality TV in the realm of popular commercial 
culture in the 1990s, it is safe to say that Williams would have considered Reality TV to be a significant and 
“serious” object of contemporary cultural analysis. For Williams, all cultural forms and practices, even those 
colloquially considered to be debased, commercial, banal or frivolous, are embedded in larger social processes 
and can thus potentially serve as indexes of those processes with equally as much “hermeneutic success” as more 
sober cultural forms (Williams 1981, 126). 
 
Mediation and Method 
 
For Williams, all developments in cultural form (including Reality TV) express, at the same time, developments 
in social practice more generally. Williams states, “they [cultural forms] have to be seen… in themselves [as] 
disguised social processes. Everything is then to be gained by their serious recognition as social processes; 
moreover as social processes of a highly significant and valuable kind” (ibid.). This is not to say that, for 
Williams, changes in cultural form are necessarily a consequence of broader social transformations. Williams is 
very careful to avoid articulations which suggest that change in cultural form necessarily follows the social, the 
technical, or the economic—formulations which would solicit charges of a mechanical or orthodox materialism. 
In Marxism and Literature, for instance, Williams explicitly retheorizes Marx‟s famous and highly contested 
base-superstructure metaphor in a way that challenges accusations of a mechanical and unidirectional causal 
movement from base to superstructure. Instead, Williams depicts a bidirectional causal movement between the 
cultural and the social that is more aptly described as dialectical. For instance, it is often the case, according to 
Williams, that “the formal [i.e., cultural] innovation is a true and integral element of the [social] changes 
themselves: an articulation, by technical discovery, of changes in consciousness which are themselves forms of 
consciousness of change” (Williams 1981, 142). Here, cultural innovation is formulated as the mediation of 
structure and agency, the mediation of acting with intent on the social world and the social world that informs all 
intentions and practice. Formal innovation is, here, the very material expression of social change.  No one could 
mistake such a formulation for a “vulgar materialism.”  
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In fact, if Williams were to be faulted, it would be for a formulation wherein the mutual constituency—the causal 
interrelatedness—of all dimensions of the social world itself becomes a perfunctory supposition, theoretical 
shorthand for glossing over the sometimes duller empirical contingencies of historical development. 
 
And yet, when it comes to the question of method, this tense and sometimes fraught relationship between the 
empirical specificities of historical movement and the deeper systematicity of those specificities (a systematicity 
unavailable to the faculties of empirical observation and therefore accessible only through theoretical 
reconstruction) is precisely where Williams focuses his attention. The name given to the problematic posed by 
this “tense and sometimes fraught” relationship in Williams‟ work, and in Marxist cultural theory, more generally, 
is mediation. The concept of mediation has suffered from its association with the (arguably misattributed) “bad 
Hegelian” move of collapsing the chaotic diversity of the world into the repressive order of universal history (in 
large part, a consequence of Louis Althusser‟s polemic against “History” and the latter‟s coded allusion to Hegel). 
In Williams‟ work, however, the concept of mediation evades such a caricatured movement. For Williams, 
mediation is a method of identifying a system of difference; the aim of the method of mediation is precisely to 
avoid subsuming empirical particularities within the identity of their systematic interrelationship.  
 
The particular dimensions of a cultural form will always exceed its systematic situation, and yet, its particularity 
can only be captured in analysis through its theoretical (i.e., systematic) representation. While Williams doesn‟t 
use the term, I argue that another way of describing this analytical movement could be “dialectical.” For instance, 
Williams argues, “[the analysis of a cultural practice requires an] adequate theoretical account of the conditions of 
a practice, for it is in these conditions that a specificity can be affirmed, and yet the inevitable relations between 
different practices explored” (Williams 1981, 145: my emphasis). Here, “dialectical” is a suitable description of 
Williams‟ formulation wherein specificity can only be affirmed through the presentation of its formal 
systematicity and vice versa. Incidentally, in light of the conceptual divide that is colloquially posited between the 
thought of Williams and that of Althusser, Williams‟ emphasis on the necessary “theoretical account of the 
conditions of a practice” exhibits an unexpected kinship with Althusser‟s critique of “immediacy” and his 




For Williams, mediation is the theory of the “how” of the interrelation between a specific practice or cultural form 
and its historical conditions. Furthermore, the “narrative” of this interrelation will always be multiple given that it 
can unfurl from various analytical points of view: from the processes of composition in a specific medium, from 
the practical relations between social and cultural forms, and from the indirect relation between experience and its 
composition (Williams 1981, 24). In The Sociology of Culture, Williams enumerates the various ways in which 
we can theorize the “how” of the interrelation between the “particular” and its social context using the example of 
the particular cultural form of Kafka‟s novel, The Trial. What are the different ways in which it is possible to 
mediate the ultimate specificity of The Trial, a specificity that exceeds all systemic identity, by its (equally 
necessary) conditions of possibility? How does The Trial instruct readers about its specific time and place—the 
raw material of its expression—while doing so through the lesson of what was, at the same time, impossible to say 
or apprehend in a direct (or, “nonallegorical”) way: 
 
Kafka‟s novel The Trial, for example, can be read from different positions, as (a) mediation by 
projection—an arbitrary and irrational social system is not directly described, in its own terms, but 
projected in its essentials, as strange and alien; or (b) mediation by the discovery of an “objective 
correlative”—a situation and characters are composed to produce, in an objective form, the subjective 
or actual feelings—an inexpressible guilt—from which the original impulse to composition came; or (c) 
mediation as a function of the fundamental social process of consciousness, in which certain crises 
which cannot otherwise be directly apprehended are “crystallized” in certain direct images and forms of 
art—images which then illuminate a basic (social and psychological) condition: not just Kafka‟s but a 
general alienation. In (c) this “basic condition” can be variably referred to the nature of a whole epoch, 
of a particular society at a particular period, or of a particular group within that society at that period. 
(ibid.) 
                                               
1
 One of the consequences of the so-called “debate” between E. P. Thompson and Louis Althusser was to cement an oversimplified 
analytical opposition between the humanist orientations of the British New Left and the structuralist orientations of continental Leftist 
theory. Proper names, such as Williams and Althusser, are often, intentionally or unintentionally, invoked as coded allusions to these 
“oppositional” orientations in Leftist social thought after the Stalinist revelations of 1956 and in light of the rethinking of Marxism that 
subsequently commenced. 
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Position “c,” or “mediation as a function of the fundamental social process of consciousness,” speaks to Williams‟ 
formulation above regarding the indirect relation between experience and its composition. Such a formulation 
refutes the standard critique of Williams (of Williams‟ “culture and society” analysis specifically, or of the work 
of the British New Left, more generally) as operating with a self-adequate or simple (i.e., positive) category of 
experience. For Williams, experience is always mediated by what he calls the social process; experience can 
therefore only ever be an indirect expression of the social. On the other hand, neither does Williams dismiss the 
concept of intention. Experience may ultimately be a negative category in the sense of being informed by forces 
that lie beyond its capacity for self-reflectivity however, for Williams, this does not mean that human agents in 
the world are haplessly ventriloquated by ideologies that set them in motion to serve the interests of a machine 
that subverts their own. Human agents act on the world with intention and this intention also informs, in specific 
ways, the dimensions of the action taken and the impact it will have. 
 
Williams‟ painstaking, provisional and circumstantial negotiation between the “centring” forces of the historical 
subject—experience, intention—and the “decentring” forces of the social process reverberates with the debates 
within the British New Left concerning the place and merit of the structuralist current emanating from the 
Continent (represented by thinkers such as Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Poulantzas). 
Williams walks a fine line through the issue of determination—a catch-all term for the problematic which 
animates these debates; for Williams, history is indeed a process, but it is a process with a subject which can never 
be controlled, in the last instance: 
 
Determination is a real social process, but never (as in some theological and some Marxist versions) 
a wholly controlling, wholly predicting set of causes. On the contrary, the reality of determination 
is the setting of limits and the exertion of pressures, within which variable social practices are 
profoundly affected but never necessarily controlled. We have to think of determination not as a 
single force, or a single abstraction of forces, but as a process in which real determining factors—
the distribution of power or of capital, social and political inheritance, relations of scale and size 
between groups—set limits and exert pressures, but neither wholly control nor wholly predict the 
outcome of complex activity within or at these limits, and under or against these pressures. 
(Williams 2003, 133) 
 
Williams‟ concept of a “structure of feeling” addresses precisely the precarious balance between the forces of 
structure and agency, between the forces of the social process and the willing, intending, experiencing subject. 
“Structure of feeling” expresses the contradiction that our personal, intimate, individual experiences (feelings) are 
always, at the same time, informed by collective and historical prejudices, expectations, fears, desires, 
conventions, institutions, laws, and modalities of the social that transgress even the most extended view of the 
feeling subject. Structure of feeling connotes the sense that the feelings that belong to us, that animate us as 
individuals, at the same time, exceed us, extend far beyond the individual, diachronically and synchronically. The 
concept of a structure of feeling, therefore, for Williams, is an effort to capture the complex mediations between 
the particular and the general that animate any specific historical conjuncture. When it comes to the investigation 
of a particular cultural form, then (Reality TV, for instance), we could ask what is the “structure of feeling”—the 
complex system of mediations—that animates the historical conjuncture which offers up Reality TV as one of its 
cultural forms? 
 
Mediating Reality TV 
 
Turning to the analysis of a particular cultural form, there are numerous vantage points from which to unfurl the 
narrative of its historical significance. According to Williams, one must be attentive to the specific dimensions of 
the actual cultural form itself, the cultural institutions and formations in which the cultural form is embedded, the 
means of the cultural production process and the social relations of the cultural production process and, finally, 
the historical and systemic interrelationships of each of the above (Williams 1981, 14). In the case of the 
phenomenon of Reality TV, one finds that a story can be told from each one of these vantage points. In the 
following analysis, I will move back and forth between Reality TV‟s institutional and political economic situation 
and the particularities of the cultural form itself in an attempt to reveal, in the spirit of Williams‟ approach, the 
ways in which Reality TV is embedded in wider economic processes, expresses dominant and concurrent 
structures of feeling, and why the emergence of Reality TV is integral to a more general history of the 
institutional organization of television and the social relations of television production.  
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Williams would instruct a contemporary theorist to be attentive to the immediate questions which the object itself 
seems to solicit (while moving beyond the immediately apparent answers): Why has Reality TV been such a 
tremendously prolific genre of programming?; How do we account for its enormous popularity, commercial 
success, unanticipated longevity, and virus-like reproductive capacity?; What social, economic, and cultural 
dynamics, developments and processes does Reality TV express?; What collective desire (structure of feeling) is 
articulated (and deferred)?; What is the promise of Reality TV and does it deliver? 
 
On the level of its immediate institutional conditions, the cultural form that came to be called Reality TV in the 
early 1990s reflects those political, economic and industrial transformations that characterize advanced consumer 
economies after the 1970s. These transformations in the mode of production—referred to by such terms as, post-
industrialism, post-Fordism, flexible accumulation, neoliberalism or postmodern capitalism, depending on the 
vantage point of the analysis—generally speaking, share a common orientation: increasing the profitability of 
private industrial and commercial enterprise. This goal was, and continues to be, achieved largely through 
(differing variations of) two principle and related strategies. The first strategy is to decrease worker control over 
labour conditions. Often referred to as the flexibilization of labour, this strategy involves lowering average wages 
in relation to the cost of living, increasing part-time and contract labour, union breaking, and offering workers 
credit in lieu of shrinking wages. The second strategy is the rationalizing of production costs through outsourcing, 
moving production, buying competing firms, using cheaper raw material, expanding markets, creating economies 
of scale, and so on.
2
 The instrumentalizing of both strategies has been facilitated by the introduction of various 
laws, policies and regulations that underwrite the interests of industry. 
 
Reality TV is an index of this industrial era of flexibilization in several ways. It is no coincidence that some of the 
earliest examples of the Reality genre emerge in the context of a Hollywood writers‟ strike at the end of the 
1980s. Not requiring the elaborate and labour-intensive scripts of comedies and dramas, early Reality TV was 
quite literally a means of union busting in the context of the writers‟ strike. Further, the formal qualities of Reality 
TV represent an effective means of rationalizing production costs; eliminating the expensive labour of actors and 
writers, relatively speaking, Reality TV is an extremely cheap media product to produce. Reality TV participants 
are attracted by the chance to achieve celebrity (their fifteen minutes of fame), entry into a certain profession 
(cooking, singing, fashion design, interior design, dancing, modeling, business management, and so on), a free 
makeover (of home, hair, body, car, or wardrobe), free therapy and lifestyle counseling (on marriage, sex, dating, 
raising children, workplace relationships, or in-laws) and, in some cases, a cash prize for the last-standing 
“survivor” of the experience.  
 
The rewards which are offered to some Reality TV participants (namely, the winners) distract from the fact that, 
unlike actors, none of the participants are paid for their involvement; none are formally reimbursed—never mind 
unionized or given benefits—for their labour in producing a product which is highly successful at exploiting 
markets globally and creating vast economies of scale and profits for producers. In the context of advanced 
consumer economies, the ability to expand one‟s franchise globally becomes, more generally, a requirement for 
competitiveness. Reality TV formats are especially advantageous with respect to their exporting and importing; in 
other words, Reality TV “travels” very well. Reality formats can be easily emptied of their cultural content and 
filled with local and regional references. As Mark Andrejevic argues, Reality TV has developed as a 
“customizable transnational format” (Andrejevic 2004, 12). 
 
Meanwhile, in order to fully historicize Reality TV we must also explore its more complex and indirect 
mediations that involves introducing a theoretical and more “speculative” analytical approach. Like empirical 
approaches, however, we begin with what we can immediately observe. Here, I will focus on two easily 
recognizable dynamics of the Reality TV phenomenon, in general. The first dynamic is the way in which Reality 
TV participates in a wider popular compulsion to public disclosure. Reality TV both reflects and aids in 
facilitating a collective and yet individually expressed drive to make oneself publicly visible, to make oneself seen 
and heard by an audience of spectators, to have one‟s fifteen minutes of fame, to simulate the public visibility of 
celebrity. This same dynamic also takes the form of a generalized lack of resistance to (or internalized 
rationalization of, and even an enthusiastic embrace of) comprehensive surveillance.  
                                               
2
 There is actually a third fundamental strategy for increasing the profitability of enterprise that is the financializing of t he production 
process. While a central and, arguably, dominant dimension of the current mode of production in advanced consumer economies, 
financialization is, for now, outside the purview of the discussion. 
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Again, Reality TV expresses and participates in a wider social modality wherein people in advanced consumer 
societies readily submit to, and in some cases invite, pervasive surveillance, monitoring, and voyeurism. From a 
generalized relative ease with the ubiquity of surveillance cameras to the electronic collection of consumer data, 
to the commodification of our name, address, and email, to the popularity of social networking sites, to the online 
broadcasting of bedroom cams and diary cams, this contemporary popular compulsion to make oneself visible is 
met half-way by Reality TV‟s invitation to participants to expose themselves—physically, emotionally, 
psychologically—to reveal their “inner selves” and most deeply personal stories, to disclose occasions of trauma, 
violence, physical harm or abuse, addiction, betrayal, and suicide or, in some cases, to make themselves the 
spectacle of humiliating scenarios. Whether on talk shows such as “Oprah,” “Dr. Phil,” or “Jerry Springer,” or 
competition-oriented programs such as “Survivor,” “Last Comic Standing,” or “America‟s Next Top Model,” the 
act of self-revelation is made more seductive—and the “invitation” to do so more aggressive—through the 
portrayal of self-disclosure as an outlet for creative and authentic self-expression, as an opportunity for personal 
growth, as “character building” and, as in the words of both Oprah and Dr. Phil, a chance for participants to “get 
real.” The second dynamic of the Reality TV phenomenon on which I will focus in this analysis is the way in 
which Reality TV both participates in, and is circumscribed by, a wider social discourse concerning the value of 
democratic participation and interactivity.  
 
According to producers as well as many contestants and audience members, what makes Reality TV a valuable 
and historically unique media experiment is the fact that Reality TV invites and even celebrates the participation 
of “ordinary people” in the programming, and that it further invites audience members to interact with program 
procedures and participants through online commentary or to even “determine” the outcome of the show through 
voting. This interactive and participatory quality, so the story goes, makes Reality TV a potentially authentic and 
“democratic” media form and, hence, different from traditional television programming. Whereas traditional 
television programming is produced according to an exclusive and hierarchical production process, Reality TV 
introduces the involvement of “ordinary people” in the production of television content. Audiences can now 
actively participate in a medium that has conventionally relegated them to the role of passive spectators. 
According to producers and much popular commentary, Reality TV promises to close the distance between the 
two sides of the television screen. While this reading of the democratizing potential of Reality TV is sometimes 
challenged in popular commentary and sentiment, it remains a dominant part of popular perception regarding the 
role and character of the Reality TV cultural form. 
 
The Promise of Access 
 
So how can one situate these two principle characteristics of Reality TV with respect to wider social and historical 
processes? How are these developments in cultural form represented by Reality TV and animated by particular 
collective sentiments mediated by the wider social formation? At least in part, the popular expectation of 
participatory and interactive media is a function of the ascendance of digital communication technologies such as 
the Internet and the World Wide Web. The introduction of the technological possibility for greater interactivity in 
the delivery of commercial entertainment and information transforms existing cultural modalities, expectations, 
and “standards” for other traditional media. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that Reality TV and digital 
forms of communication become dominant cultural forms concurrently. Here we have an example of the way in 
which the emergence of new technological capabilities transforms the cultural expectations surrounding “old” 
media. However, the movement of determination flows in the opposite direction as well: the popular critique and 
perceived shortcomings of old media prepare the ground for the popular reception, use, and institutionalization of 
new media. In the case of the traditional medium of television the popular critique circumscribing its production 
was what Williams refers to as the “problem of access” (Williams 1981, 91).  
 
The problem of access concerns both the means and social relations of cultural production, generally, but is more 
pronounced in the case of mediated forms of culture and communication. With the emergence of any new form of 
communication or culture, according to Williams, it is initially characterized by a relatively open, non-specialized 
and diverse set of practices. As the cultural form or mode of communication develops, and especially in the case 
of a mediated form of culture or communication (the medium of television, for example), the practices which 
constitute it become more specialized and the distance between “producer” and “consumer” becomes increasingly 
wide. This is so even in cases where the production process may be publicly as opposed to privately owned: “as a 
culture becomes richer and more complex, involving many more artistic techniques developed to a high degree of 
specialization, the social distance of many practices becomes much greater, and there is a virtually inevitable if 
always complex set of divisions between participants and spectators in the various arts” (ibid.). 
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When we do introduce the dynamics of ownership and management into the development history of the medium 
of television, Williams points out how in the case of the privatized production process, the transition from single 
capitalist owner or family to corporate to a conglomerate structure introduces new layers of professional 
management to the production process, creating “significantly greater distance from immediate producers” and 
particularly so in the case of technically complex production (ibid., 117). As this model of corporate and/or 
conglomerate private ownership becomes dominant in the sphere of television production, as it did in the U.S. and 
increasingly so in the rest of the global north, its characteristic social relations become determining and divisive 
(ibid., 91). The conglomerate structure of ownership, for example, entails that ownership and control of television 
production becomes just one sector of a wider ownership structure of a (non-specifically cultural) productive and 
financial arena. In this context, the production of television has less and less to do with television as a cultural 
form, per se: “[conglomerate institutional organization] is at once dominant in modern cultural production and 
yet, in its determining forms, radically separate from it; its „purpose‟ now primarily elsewhere” (ibid., 117). 
Historically, television production both helps to determine and is determined by the fundamental contradiction of 
modern capitalism: “increasingly socialized forms of production [and especially in highly technical production] 
are defined and limited by private… forms of ownership and control” (ibid.). 
 
This history of the increasingly restricted access to the production of television—which is to say, the history of 
the increasingly undemocratic social relations of television production—expresses itself as a generalized 
alienation of television audiences, the collective expression of what Williams refers to as the problem of access. 
This generalized alienation is the ground against which we must figure the introduction of digital technologies 
and the enhanced capacity for more democratic participation and audience interaction that these technologies 
represent.
3
 This is not to argue, of course, that digital forms of communication and culture have been unanimously 
successful (or successful at all) at actually delivering on this promise. However, this historical context goes some 
distance in explaining why the promise itself—its rhetorical value and currency—implanted so readily in the 
cultural ground and collective sensibility. 
 
The Work of Being Watched 
 
However, the moment we identify where the force of human intention (collective or individual) is at play in the 
social narrative—here, the willful formation of the desire for, and the seeking out of, democratically enhanced 
modes of cultural production and access to new modalities of self-expression—according to Williams‟ sociology 
of culture method,
4
 the analysis cannot rest there. Instead, we must resituate that instance of willful human agency 
with respect to the attendant forces of social structure that overdetermine it.
5
 The popular desire for public 
visibility, self-expression, access to cultural production processes, participatory and interactive modes of 
communication and culture, and all those concomitant cultural practices animated by this desire (of which the 
phenomenon of Reality TV is one of the most iconic) are, at the same time, expressions of an economic and 
political “structure”—i.e., a certain stage of the social mode of production, namely “advanced consumer 
society”—which requires that its agents voluntarily submit themselves to comprehensive surveillance in order to 
facilitate the mass customization of consumer products. In this analytical narrative, critical focus is diverted from 
the particularity of the Reality TV form, to its identity with the general movement of consumer society. Here, the 
significance of Reality TV is not what may be unique about it, but the manner in which its cultural reverberations 
are overdetermined by the social imperatives of a certain historical development of mass production.  
 
In his book, Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched, Mark Andrejevic describes the ideological significance of 
visibility and interactivity as collectively internalized values in the era of mass customized production.  
 
                                               
3
 The general adoption of television in the 1950s, like that of digital media which would follow 30 years later, was circumscribed by the 
promise that it would “democratize” culture. In the case of television, however, the promise of democratizing culture referred to bringing 
once elite or exclusive cultural forms and events (plays, concerts, operas, political speeches, inaugurations) to a wider and more diverse 
audience. It also referred to a certain “leveling” of culture that would take place when these elite cultural forms were broadcast alongside 
popular forms (sporting events, game shows, situation-comedies, variety shows and children‟s programming). This earlier promise of 
democratization did not refer to a wider participation in the production of content, as does the promise of Reality TV. Neither TV, then, nor 
Reality TV, now, promises to democratize the social relations of TV production which, as Williams has argued, would be necessary to 
precipitate any profound change in the industry. 
4
 And this particular movement of Williams‟ method is another example of its dialectical character. 
5
 “Overdetermination” is an Althusserian term to which Williams, I believe, would not object. 
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In what he calls the “interactive, mass-customized economy,” consumers voluntarily submit to comprehensive 
surveillance of “the rhythms of their everyday lives” whereupon goods and services are fashioned to fit the 
specific contours of consumers‟ needs and desires as perceived by manufactures and marketers. Mass 
customization, made possible by digital interactivity and a mass of consumers willing to live their lives online and 
on camera, promises to overcome the alienation, massification and homogenization of mass industrial society 
through the ostensible democratization of the production process through the “input” (monitoring) of consumers 
(Andrejevic 2004, 54). Allegorically, Reality TV promises to overcome the alienation of mass media 
entertainment through the participation of ordinary people in the production of media content and the interactivity 
of the audience: 
 
Mass customization emerges as an effective marketing strategy in an era of increasing economic 
stratification even as it promises increased democratization. The deployment of the offer of 
shared control becomes more ideologically important at a time when real control over economic 
resources is becoming increasingly concentrated. At the same time, increasing stratification 
requires more comprehensive forms of marketplace monitoring in order to rationalize the 
production and marketing processes for an ever wider range of goods for a more segmented 
market. The offer of participation both compensates (symbolically) for growing inequality and 
serves as an inducement to submit to the forms of interactive monitoring relied on by producers to 
reduce uncertainty in an increasingly diversified market. 
Highlighting this conjunction is the… resurgence in the “democratic” genre of Reality TV. 
(ibid., 67-8) 
 
Andrejevic‟s most salient point is that in the era he calls “the death of privacy,” cultural practices of interactivity 
and visibility, and the submission to comprehensive monitoring are productive, and like commercial industrial 
production, produce surplus value that is appropriated privately: “interactivity functions increasingly as a form of 
productive surveillance allowing for the commodification of the products generated by what I describe as the 
work of being watched. … [R]eality TV anticipates the exploitation of… the work of being watched, a form of 
production wherein consumers are invited to sell access to their personal lives… [We] create value for advertisers 
and marketers by allowing ourselves to be watched” (ibid., 2, 6, 8). The reproduction of an economy of mass 
customization requires the generalized internalization of the value of self-disclosure towards which Reality TV 
functions as a form of civic pedagogy. 
 
Voyeurism TV is, therefore, mediated by its increasingly important economic role in the emerging interactive 
economy. Andrejevic‟s analysis extends the thesis of Dallas Smythe according to the transformations in the mode 
of production that have transpired since the time of Smythe‟s formulation. In Dependency Road, Smythe 
articulates the now canonical (within the field of the political economy of media) thesis that watching television is 
a form of productive labour where the value produced is appropriated by media industries that sell (for a profit) 
the “audience commodity” to advertisers. Andrejevic extends Smythe‟s analysis to demonstrate the way in which, 
today, being watched is also productive labour, illustrating the contemporary collapse, as did Smythe, of the sites 
of production and domestic space, work and leisure. 
 
For Williams, this analysis of Reality TV‟s continuity (its identity or “sameness,” in other words) with the more 
general development of commodity production and surplus extraction is both accurate and partial. A holistic, 
historical analysis of Reality TV could not rest on the question of its general identity with the dominant 
movement of the mode of production. Nonetheless, its general identity is the requisite ground for the definition of 
its particularity. 
 
First as Tragedy, then as Farce 
 
In Marx‟s The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in which he analyzes the mediation of history and political 
struggles, when referring to the 1851 machinations of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon‟s nephew), he opens the work 
by saying: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, 
twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” If we follow Raymond Williams‟ 
narrative of the historical development of the dramatic mode since the second part of the nineteenth century, it is 
possible to make the surprising argument that Reality TV is the farcical reiteration of the naturalist revolution in 
drama. Placing Reality TV on an historical continuum with the work of Chekov and Ibsen appears to be a farcical 
proposition in itself.  
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Nonetheless, Williams argues that television is the ultimate realization of the original naturalist convention of the 
enclosed room drama. I will extend Williams‟ thesis to argue that Reality TV, in particular, more so than in the 
case of television more generally, can be seen as the inheritor of the naturalist dramatic convention. By 
rearticulating Williams‟ narrative, and in so doing identifying another vantage point from which to map the 
mediations of Reality TV, we introduce, once again, the force of human agency into the analysis of the 
developmental movement of cultural forms. 
 
According to Williams, since the 1880s, dramatic conventions have been dominated by the theatrical form 
referred to as the “drama of the enclosed room,” or the “enclosed-stage-as-room theatre” (Williams 2003, 51). 
The naturalist convention in drama reduced the narrative scale of historical and tragic drama—the stories of kings 
and religious leaders, of the victories and defeats of historical heroes and villains, of the battles of church and 
state, and so on—to “interior” stories: interpersonal or interfamilial conflict, romantic betrayal and courtship, 
psychological drama, existential crisis, living room wars and salon politics, the “victories and defeats” of ordinary 
people and everyday life. The naturalist convention in drama reflected the rise of the bourgeoisie and of civil 
society as the arena of the “private citizen.” This is era of the emergence of the mutually defining dichotomy of 
the public and private spheres, again, each predicated on the newly created private citizen. Theatrical forms 
expressed this newly generated interest in the private world of the family, the romantic relation or the 
friendship—where a few characters live out their private experience of an unseen public world (ibid., 52). 
 
Williams argues that not only did television inherit the stylistic and thematic conventions of the enclosed room 
drama, television was able to realize the original naturalist convention in a way that the theatre stage could only 
anticipate and approximate. However, those stylistic and thematic conventions of television—namely, the 
portrayal of interior stories—which were attributed by media historians to the technical possibilities, first, of 
cinema and, subsequently, of television (the close-up shot, the magnification of facial expression, the 
amplification of quiet sounds and whispers, jump shots back and forth between characters emphasizing dramatic 
interaction, etc.), Williams demonstrates to have been constituent of a structure of feeling that predates both film 
and television and must be explained with respect to historical development of the dramatic mode: 
 
Since a major structure of feeling, in the art of the period, was in any case of this kind [i.e., the 
enclosed-room drama], it is not surprising that many TV plays reproduced this assumption of the 
nature of representative reality. This was a drama of the box in the same fundamental sense as the 
naturalist drama had been the drama of the framed stage. The technical possibilities that were 
commonly used corresponded to this structure of feeling: the enclosed internal atmosphere; the 
local interpersonal conflict; the close-up on a private feeling. Indeed these emphases could be 
seen as internal properties of the medium itself, when in fact they were a selection of some of its 
properties according to the dominant structure of feeling. 
(ibid.) 
 
If television represents the technological realization of an already dominant structure of feeling, Reality TV hoists 
the realization of that structure of feeling onto a whole new level: instead of promising a “real-life” portrayal of 
the private feelings and conflicts of everyday life (as does traditional TV drama) Reality TV promises to capture 
emotional and interpersonal worlds of “real-life” itself. Speaking of the mid 1950s, the period in which television 
becomes a majority cultural form in the West, Williams says, “In substance and in method [television offered] the 
exploring „eye of the camera,‟ the feel for everyday ordinary life, the newly respected rhythms of the speech of 
work and the streets and of authentic privacy (what was later described ominously… as „dialogue as if wire-
tapped‟)” (ibid., 54). Williams could not have realized just how ominous, and prescient, this observation was to 
be. Reality TV showcases dialogue, literally, wire-tapped. Further, Reality TV is the public exhibition, par 
excellence, of the private anxieties and emotional pathologies of contemporary consumer society: a fearful 
equation of invisibility and valuelessness, anxiety surrounding the prospects for social mobility, the 
internalization of interpersonal competition and the dissolution of organic forms of cooperation, personal 
“success” as an unpredictable function of lottery-like fortune over the culmination of hard work and perseverance, 
a narcissistic compulsion to fulfill the mandate of self-disclosure, or the alienation of defining oneself with respect 
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A Neoliberal Theatre of Suffering 
 
For the final twist of this analysis (which is by no means to say that we have exhausted the possible social 
mediations of the cultural form of Reality TV) I want to situate the structure of feeling described by Williams 
above as the private and “interior” stories of the enclosed-room drama with respect to the political and economic 
imperatives of the social formation referred to more generally as neoliberalism. In her article, “Reality TV: A 
Neoliberal Theatre of Suffering,” Anna McCarthy illustrates Williams‟ claim that “manifest commercial modes of 
control and selection become, in effect, cultural modes” (Williams 1981, 104) when she argues that Reality TV is 
an “important arena in which to observe the vernacular diffusion of neoliberal common sense” (McCarthy 2007, 
17). In this analysis, “neoliberal common sense” is itself one of the structures of feeling that animates Reality TV 
in the present historical conjuncture. 
 
The vernacular diffusion of neoliberal common sense takes place through a mode of ideological production (or, 
“technology of the self,” for those who prefer Foucault‟s conceptual apparatus to that of Marx) which McCarthy 
calls “responsibilization” (ibid, 18). The modality of neoliberalism, the hegemonic social formation in advanced 
consumer societies in the global north since the 1980s, involves the privatizing and individualizing of social, 
economic and political forms of life, effectively shrinking the purview of the state and those public institutions 
whose purpose was to serve the interests of a collectivity or to protect common resources. Elevating the ideal of 
the self-governing individual over the caretaker state, the “common sense” of neoliberalism requires that subjects 
naturalize the practices and idea of being fully responsible for, and only obligated to, the self. Responsibilization 
refers to this process of the subject‟s internalizing of the injunctions of the neoliberal formation.  
 
For McCarthy, Reality TV is one such technology of the self, instructing audiences and participants that social 
responsibility is individual responsibility, supporting “privatizing forms of governance and civic life” (ibid.). 
Reality TV‟s foregrounding of psychological warfare between contestants reflects the neoliberal process of 
“shrinking [the] public sphere… based [increasingly] in psychologized models of public culture which draw their 
warrants from intimate experiences and affective performances of the self” (ibid.). The traumatized individual 
pays a central role in the theatre of Reality TV. Concocting scenarios of betrayal, humiliation, fear or revulsion, 
ostracism, group marginalization and condemnation, or the public revelation of personal defects and 
“unacceptable” physical characteristics, Reality TV “produces scene after scene of painful civic pedagogy” (ibid., 
19). Such instruction in negotiating painful and precarious survival techniques, demonstrates, according to 
McCarthy, “the ways trauma works in the service of self-governing, as part of neoliberalism‟s outsourcing of state 
functions into the private realm,” (ibid., 31) where competition (rather than cooperation), the lottery gamble 
(rather than commitment), or the “makeover (rather than state assistance) is the key to social mobility and civic 




With respect to the relationship between cultural forms and wider social processes, Williams‟ sociology of culture 
requires that we not rest too comfortably, with too much certainty, on the determining force of either social 
structure or intentional human agency. Williams‟ approach would have us negotiate the possibility that the 
visibility imperative which circumscribes the Reality TV form functions simultaneously as an expression of 
economic and political processes, as a mechanism of social control, and as a calculated response of individuals to 
a popular anxiety, on the one hand, and to a desire for greater interactive (democratic) community, on the other, in 
the context of the objective forces of standardization and rationalization that contain expressions of self and 
individuality in consumer capitalism. Williams would have us be attentive to the way in which Reality TV both 
responds to and informs contemporary structures of feeling. For example, if the cultural production of Reality TV 
is shaped by a process of globalizing markets and the flexibilizing of labour relations, it also rewrites the narrative 
of “the American dream” (i.e., the myth of social advancement through hard work, ingenuity, and perseverance in 
the context of legally equalized opportunity) to reflect the dynamics of competition and social lottery.  
 
However contrived and highly manipulated are the scenarios of Reality TV, they also represent the greater 
“realism” of social interaction in late modern consumer societies where the standardizing logic of the industrial 
process organizes the social world even on the private level of personalities and emotion and through the most 
“personal” and spontaneous of human encounters. And, yet, in the restless spirit of Williams‟ sociology of 
culture, we can never discount a dimension of experience that will always exceed history as the present force of 
the past, of sedimented or canalized practices.  
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This irreducible excess—what is in motion, active, alive, here and now—is always in play. Attempts to articulate 
its essence have grasped for terms such as, “temporal presence,” “realization of the instant,” “specificity of 
present being,” and the “inalienably physical” (Williams 1977, 128). However, for Williams, the concept of that 
object to which we refer simply as “the social” should already encompass this sense of the excess or “outside” of 
history as much as it encompasses the objective force of the formal, the sedimented or the institutional. In fact, in 
Williams‟ dense and expansive concept of the social, even this latter sense of the “objective” and formalized is 
rendered dynamic in his presentation of it. While the social—as history, as formalized practice—may impose 
itself on the present, it is an analytical mistake, according to Williams, to represent the social as that which is 
fixed or finalized, and not, rather, as that which is itself in constant reform and revision. For Williams, history and 
the social are continuously “in process”; the present acts on the past as much as the past informs the active 
present. This “impossibly” precarious analytical balance is expressed in the chapter called “Structures of Feeling” 
in Marxism and Literature:  
 
In most description and analysis, culture and society are expressed in a habitual past tense. The strongest 
barrier to the recognition of human cultural activity is this immediate and regular conversion of 
experience into finished products. … [This vision of experience as finished product] is habitually 
projected, not only into the always moving substance of the past, but into contemporary life, in which 
relationships, institutions and formations in which we are still actively involved are converted, by this 
procedural mode, into formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes. 
(ibid.) 
 
A structure of feeling is therefore simply a term for the social itself, a concept in Williams that is anything but 
simple. It may be more appropriate to speak of the social, for Williams, as a problematic rather than as a concept: 
it enunciates the problem of capturing an object that is constantly in motion, in process, and yet exerts the force of 
an objective totality. In an attempt to capture such an object, Williams‟ sociology of culture shares the totalizing 
movement of Marxian dialectical analysis, the restlessness and historical sensitivity of Adorno‟s negative 
dialectics, the attention to alterity of Derrida‟s deconstructive cultural readings, and yet demonstrates an empathy 
for the “volk” that reverberates with a Romantic sensibility. Williams‟ kind of analytical nuance may be out of 
step with the present inclinations of radical cultural theory and, perhaps, understandably so. One could argue that 
these are times urgently requiring the kind of vulgar or declarative statements that Williams‟ sociology of culture 
does not condone. Nonetheless, as method, Williams‟ sociology of culture stands as a test, as the kind of ground 
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